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BOOKS RECEIVED

Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice. By Judge Harold J. Rothwax. New York, NY: Random House. 1996. Pp.
238. Hardcover. $23.00.
Have the scales of our criminal justice system tilted so
much in favor of a defendant's due process rights that we
have subordinated the search for the truth? Columbia law
professor Judge Harold J. Rothwax shouts "yes" in his new
book Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice. While some
commentators have characterized the chaos of the O.J. Simpson trial as an anomaly, Judge Rothwax believes the trial exemplifies everything that is wrong with our criminal justice
system. He forcefully argues that the system is plagued by
overly complex rules that: (1) give criminals unnecessary
protections; and (2) encourage their lawyers to obfuscate the
truth. While this rhetoric may sound like that of a "hanging
judge" who "knows" that ninety-five percent of all defendants
are guilty, readers will be surprised to learn that Judge
Rothwax spent twelve years as a criminal defense attorney
and was a vice-chairman of the American Civil Liberties
Union. Nevertheless, Judge Rothwax's twenty-five years on
the bench have convinced him that the due process "revolution" has gone too far. In Guilty, he uses dozens of compelling
anecdotes to support his thesis that the legislature and appellate courts have protected criminal defendants' rights to the
extent that society is now a victim of a paralyzed system that
is unable to do justice.
In chapter one, "Anything but the Truth," Judge
Rothwax condemns the Supreme Court expansion of the
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He complains that the
investigation for truth and justice has become mired in a
quagmire of process and procedure. If the primary purpose of
procedural rules is to enhance the discovery of truth, the
question arises: What are the best methods to accomplish
this and still stay within the bounds of a Constitution that
protects citizens from excessive governmental power? Judge
1271
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Rothwax argues that while Americans have wrestled with
the limits of government power since independence, we have
stopped questioning the fundamental precepts of criminal
procedure.
Chapter two, "Snowy Nights and Cars on the Run," details the terrible confusion surrounding the Fourth Amendment that has confounded a generation of law students, lawyers, judges, and police officers. Judge Rothwax exposes the
problem with judicially created criminal procedure by chronicling the haphazard development of the exclusionary rule.
He then openly criticizes the disproportionate remedies afforded criminals when law enforcement makes an innocent
technical error during a search or seizure. Judge Rothwax's
narrations effectively bring the Fourth Amendment to life.
For example, he tells the story behind Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,where, in the absence of police misconduct, a patently guilty murderer was set free simply because New
Hampshire had allowed the attorney general to issue
warrants.
Judge Rothwax illustrates the problems with reasonable
suspicion, plain view, automobile search, and the other convoluted and often illogical doctrines that police officers are expected to understand. He declares that Fourth Amendment
law is "arbitrary and unknowable." Moreover, the exclusionary rule, as presently designed, all too often results in the
exclusion of reliable evidence and fails to deter police misconduct. Judge Rothwax proposes a discretionary exclusionary
rule based on reasonableness that gives the courts the flexibility to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly,
the court would ask: (1) Was there probable cause?; (2) Was a
search warrant obtained?; (3) Were there exigent circumstances that made obtaining a warrant unfeasible?; (4) What
was the nature of the intrusion?; (5) What was the quantum
of evidence?; (6) What was the seriousness of the crime under
investigation?; and (7) Was the defendant believed to be
dangerous?
In chapter three, 'The Silence of the Fox," Judge
Rothwax criticizes the Miranda rule as needless formalism
that ignores the real issue of protection from police coercion.
He refutes Miranda's underlying premise that all custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive. Instead of simply protecting people from coercion, Miranda requires law enforce-
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ment to urge suspects not to confess, thereby decreasing the
likelihood that people will take responsibility for their
crimes. Additionally, the expanded definition of custody has
required law enforcement to give the Miranda warning
whenever they speak to a suspect. According to Judge
Rothwax, the endless pursuit of fairness has perverted the
justice system into a game where a criminal is given a fair
chance to escape punishment. Judge Rothwax's solution is
simple, he wants Miranda overruled outright. The rigidness
of Miranda forces courts to choose between two evils: invent
asinine reasoning to get around the rule, or suppress an
otherwise voluntary statement. Judge Rothwax believes
that, in the age of videotaped confessions, there are already
enough safeguards in place to protect people from police
abuse.
Chapter four, "Clam Up and Call Your Lawyer," decries
the growth of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Judge
Rothwax traces the historic development of the right, and
then argues that the "critical stage" theory of the right to
counsel needlessly ties the hands of investigators searching
for the truth. He castigates the Supreme Court for the Massiah and Moulton opinions that have prevented post-arrest
investigation by law enforcement. According to Judge
Rothwax, these excessive extensions of the right to counsel do
not further the policy of preventing police coercion.
In chapter five, "The Rush to Nowhere," Judge Rothwax
states that "speedy trial statutes do not guarantee rapid justice." Outrageous anecdotes from his courtroom illustrate
how defendants use the New York speedy trial statute to
avoid justice. He asks: Is dismissing the indictment really
the best remedy for a one day technical violation of an arbitrary time requirement? In the author's experience, these
rigid statutes only force the state to be ready for trial and do
not serve the following policy goals behind the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial: (1) protecting the accused from
prolonged imprisonment and the stigma of public suspicion;
(2) preserving evidence and witnesses' memories; and (3) ensuring society's and the victim's right to have prompt justice.
Judge Rothwax would ask: Is the defendant ready for a
speedy trial? Does the defendant even want a speedy trial?
He proposes to repeal mandatory speedy trial computations
and institute a case-by-case analysis of whether the defend-
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ant's right and desire for a speedy trial were actually
prejudiced. Again, the standard would be based on reasonableness and focus on issues such as trial complexity and the
defendant's diligence in trial preparation.
In chapter six, "The Theater of the Absurd," Judge
Rothwax censures attorneys for their unprofessional behavior in the courtroom and the judges who let them get away
with it. He agrees with the popular notion that theatrics
have replaced the pursuit of truth as the foundation of many
criminal trials. Judge Rothwax even goes so far as to question the fundamental principals of our adversarial system.
He believes that defense attorneys have pushed the ethical
bounds of zealous advocacy to the extent that attorneys now
feel they have carte blanche to actively distort and subvert
the truth. Without giving any specific suggestions, he recommends that the judiciary reevaluate the defense lawyer's role
because the criminal bar will never voluntarily accept greater
duties as officers of the court. He does assert that though this
complex issue may initially appear to be an ethical one, it is a
larger policy question that can best be addressed by reevaluating procedural and evidentiary rules.
Chapter seven, "The Plea Bargain," chronicles how the
staggering volume of criminal cases forces the system to dispose ninety to ninety-five percent of the cases by plea bargain. While Judge Rothwax defends plea bargains as a necessary evil, he complains that this system gives defendants
lighter sentences than they deserve only because of the need
to avoid costly trials. He states that this unfortunate practice
will continue until courts are given adequate resources and
the rules of criminal procedure are streamlined.
In chapter eight, "Poker-Faced Justice," Judge Rothwax
criticizes unfair discovery statutes that require full disclosure
by the prosecution. He feels that divulging the state's case
gives defendants and defense attorneys the opportunity to
concoct a defense that is consistent with the evidence provided by the state. While a defendant should have the right
to hear the evidence against him, Judge Rothwax believes
this information is often misused to fabricate an alibi. He
questions why prosecutors must disclose everything in their
investigation when defense attorneys are only required to
turn over information they intend to use at trial.
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Judge Rothwax uses the O.J. Simpson trial to illustrate
the problem. He quotes Robert Shapiro early in the case,
"We'll devise a defense once we know what the state has to
offer." He then recounts how the defense changed Simpson's
story that he was sleeping during the time of the murders
once the evidence revealed that he had made cellular phone
calls at that time. Similarly, the Menendez brothers proclaimed their complete innocence until their confession was
obtained by the prosecution. Only then, did the brothers tell
their tale of violent sexual abuse by the father.
Judge Rothwax points out that in the O.J. Simpson trial,
the defense did not have to disclose the results of their own
DNA tests because they were not used at trial, presumably
because they were incriminating. Meanwhile, the defense
was able to spend enormous resources to create reasonable
doubt about the state's DNA tests - tests that likely had
identical results as their own. While the Fifth Amendment
clearly protects against self-incrimination and the prosecutors should be forced to turn over any exculpatory evidence,
Judge Rothwax notes that there is nothing in the Constitution requiring complete disclosure of the state's case before
trial.
His solution is called the "Sealed Envelope Proposal."
Once a defendant is formally charged, he would be required
to write down his version of what happened and place it in a
sealed envelope. A judge would hold the envelope and the
contents would never be seen by the state unless the defendant testified. If he did, the envelope would be opened to confirm that the defendant's original story is consistent with his
testimony. If it was not, the defendant's prior statement
would be available to impeach him. Judge Rothwax would
condition the defense's full access to the state's case with delivery of the sealed statement. He argues that this rule does
not increase the risk of an erroneous convictions, it simply
prevents a defendant from lying on the witness stand. This
proposal will likely provoke outrage from the defense bar and
civil libertarians, yet Judge Rothwax raises an often overlooked question: Are procedural rules unfair simply because
they make the conviction of a defendant more likely?
In chapter nine, "Speak No Evil," Judge Rothwax blasts
the Griffin and Carter Supreme Court decisions that require
a judge to tell the jury it cannot draw adverse inferences from
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a defendant's failure to testify at trial. He finds it ironic that
while an innocent witness to a murder is forced to testify, the
defendant, the one who likely knows the most about the
crime, is given an a extra layer of protection. Judge Rothwax
proposes that, "[i]f it appears from the evidence that the defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny evidence against him, the jury should be instructed that they
may consider his failure to do so ...."
In chapter ten, "A Jury of Our Fears," Judge Rothwax
confesses his lack of faith in our jury system. He argues that
the jury selection process does not result in representative
and capable juries. He echoes the popular rhetoric that juries
may be getting "dumber" because educated people either easily avoid service, or are eliminated by defense attorneys' preemptory challenges. Judge Rothwax argues that limiting
both sides to three preemptory challenges would simplify the
process and undercut the power of "scientific" jury consultants. Additionally, he proposes allowing eleven-to-one or
ten-to-two jury verdicts in criminal cases. He argues that
unanimous verdicts are not necessarily more reliable. One
study shows that the first ballot usually determines the outcome of a trial. Moreover, the study suggests that juries
rarely change holdout votes through analytical reasoning; instead, pressure and intimidation are frequently employed.
In the final chapter, "Judgment Day," Judge Rothwax
proffers the O.J. Simpson trial as smoking gun (or bloody
glove) proof of a system "dangerously out of order." His indictment condemns the trial's needless length. He attributes
this to the jury selection process, abstruse procedural rules,
inflammatory defense attorneys who created "'evidence' out
of innuendo" and tried the case in the media, and a weak
judge who failed to take control of the attorneys. He explains
that his disgust with the case is not with the verdict itself,
but with the jury's failure to examine the evidence. Unfortunately, Judge Rothwax seems to have lost faith with juries as
a whole, writing that, "juries are fragile bodies subject to
emotion, suggestion, and speculation.., who [often] lack the
capacity to intelligently evaluate the evidence."
Although Judge Rothwax admits that most cases are not
like the O.J. Simpson trial, he asserts that under our current
system, many could be. This assertion is flawed however, because most defendants do not have the resources to hire a
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"dream team" of criminal defense lawyers. Instead most defendants are poor and are represented by an overworked public defender. The author forgets that most public defenders
do not have the time or resources to hire a team of investigators and experts or launch a counter-attack against the prosecutor by filing hundreds of pre-trial motions.
Guilty is well written and is recommended reading to
lawyer and lay person alike. Judge Rothwax's story telling
ability, trenchant analysis, and innovative solutions are all
well synthesized into a incisive indictment of the status quo.
Civil libertarians will vigorously oppose his proposals and label them oppressive. Notwithstanding these predictable recriminations, America needs to rationally debate the policies
behind our current rules and ask whether these rules actually further these polices.
Legislators campaigning to get tough on crime are likely
to champion Judge Rothwax's proposals. However, his reforms should not necessarily be viewed as a panacea.
Clearly, Judge Rothwax's stories of guilty criminals getting
off on "technicalities" invoke outrage. Nevertheless, one
should temper this anger with the knowledge that these egregious cases are rare exceptions. Admittedly, this does not
abate the injustices done in these cases. However, legislators
bent on cracking down on legal "loopholes" are urged to carefully deliberate any proposed changes to our system. Criminal justice reform that is driven by anecdote, and ignores systematic research, has dangerous implications when it
proposes to abrogate fundamental constitutional protections.
Jed S. Ritchey

